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Following decades during which endemic weaknesses
and inadequate control of the public finances con-
tributed importantly to macro-economic instability in
Brazil, the country embarked in the late 1990s on a
sustained fiscal adjustment, marked by high and ris-
ing primary surpluses of the consolidated public sec-
tor. The adjustment reflected strengthened policies;
institutional improvements; and, especially since the
mid-2000s, the beneficial effects on the public finances
of a favorable external environment (strong external
demand, high commodity prices and low internation-
al interest rates) and of increased domestic policy
credibility. The resulting moderation in the public
debt and the improvement in its structure allowed a
strongly countercyclical response to the downturn in
activity in the wake of the global financial crisis of
2008–09. As a result, the Brazilian economy emerged
from the downturn with remarkable speed and rela-
tively small economic and social costs.
Fiscal policy remained, however, strongly expan-
sionary during the subsequent cyclical upswing,
fueling an unsustainable pace of domestic demand
growth, a pick-up of inflationary pressures and a
significant deterioration of the external current
account. Arresting and ultimately reversing these
trends has become an important short-term impera-
tive for macroeconomic, and in particular fiscal,
policy in Brazil. 
Moreover, the country continues to face a number of
more structural challenges in its public finances: the
need for substantial and long-overdue tax reforms; for
related reforms in the intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements; and for further reforms in the social
security, civil service and health systems. It also needs
to continue efforts to strengthen the tax administra-
tion and increase the cost-effectiveness of public
spending at all levels of government. Newer chal-
lenges include creating fiscal space for a needed large
public investment effort; ensuring a responsible man-
agement of the growing natural resource wealth; and
adequately provisioning for rising fiscal risks, espe-
cially from the operations of financial and non-finan-
cial public enterprises that have been increasingly
excluded from the fiscal targets.
This paper provides a compact overview of these
short and medium-term challenges. Following a brief
review in the second section of main historical trends
in Brazil’s public finances and of the country’s fiscal
response to the global financial crisis, the third section
focuses on the current macroeconomic challenges and
the role of fiscal policy in addressing them. The fourth
section briefly discusses the main structural fiscal
challenges mentioned above. 
Background
Historical trends
During the ‘lost decade’of the 1980s and the crisis-rid-
den early 1990s, high inflation represented the main
mechanism of adjustment of the Brazilian public
finances, as it eroded the real value of public expendi-
tures, while revenues were largely protected through
indexation mechanisms. The rapid decline of inflation
in the wake of the implementation of the Plano Real in
the mid-1990s exposed this fundamental weakness.
Despite a rapid growth of revenues, boosted by the
surge in demand, the primary (non-interest) balance of
the consolidated public sector1 deteriorated significant-
ly, moving into deficit. The overall deficit narrowed ini-
tially, reflecting the sharp decline in nominal interest
rates, but worsened subsequently (Figure 1). The net
public debt climbed steeply (Figure 2). 
* Former Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, International
Monetary Fund.
1 The consolidated public sector is defined to include the central, state
and local governments, their non-financial enterprises and the Central
Bank. In recent years, the coverage of both public sector targets and
data has been narrowed, to exclude two major federal companies, the
petroleum (Petrobras) and electricity (Eletrobras) ones.The fiscal weakening contributed, along with a 
relatively lax monetary policy and a significant 
real appreciation of the exchange rate, to the emer-
gence of serious external imbalances that ultimately
forced in early 1999 a strong adjustment program,
supported by large external official financing. 
The program included: the floating of the Brazilian
currency real; a substantial tightening of monetary
policy and the adoption of inflation targeting; and 
a range of revenue-raising and expenditure-contain-
ment measures. A key ingredient of the fiscal 
adjustment was the adoption in 2000 of a Fiscal
Responsibility Law that mandates the setting of
three-year rolling targets for the primary surplus;
stipulates limits on debt and certain types of public
expenditures relative to revenues, as well as strict
transparency requirements for the operations of all
levels of government; and prohibits intergovern-
mental bailouts. Also crucial was the tightening 
of controls on the indebtedness
of sub-national governments,
whose finances had contributed
importantly to the fiscal deterio-
ration of the mid 1990s.2
The fiscal performance remained
relatively strong during the 2000s,
until the onset of the global cri-
sis: the primary surplus fluctuat-
ed narrowly in the 3–4 percent of
GDP range, and the overall bal-
ance (after a sharp but brief dete-
rioration in 2002, reflecting the
adverse impact of the deprecia-
tion of the real during that year)
improved strongly. The net public
debt also declined steadily, from a
peak of nearly 60 percent of
GDP in 2002 to around 40 per-
cent of GDP in 2008. The struc-
ture of the public debt improved
as well, with the share denomi-
nated in foreign currencies declin-
ing from over 20 percent at the
beginning of the decade to under
2 percent in 2008, and the share
at fixed rates rising from around
12 percent to over 35 percent over
the same period. Moreover, the
average maturity of the debt
increased significantly, reducing
rollover risks.
The improvement in the primary balance was wholly
accounted for by a steady increase in the tax burden,
as general government non-interest spending rose by
the equivalent of a cumulative 4 percent or so of
GDP. The rise in spending was mostly driven by
transfers to households (pensions and social assis-
tance programs, including the well publicized Bolsa
Familia3), which contributed significantly to the
improvement in the indicators of poverty and income
inequality4 from the beginning of the last decade to
2008.
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2 In 1997, the federal government refinanced the debt of the states
and of most municipalities. In contrast to previous bailout
episodes, this was accompanied by strict debt servicing require-
ments which, in combination with a prohibition of new borrow-
ing, required sub-national governments to run significant primary
surpluses. 
3 The Bolsa Familia pays poor households to keep children in school.
It is one of the most successful international examples of condition-
al cash transfer programs.
4 The poverty ratio fell from around 35 percent at the beginning of
the 2000s to around 22 percent in 2008, and the Gini coefficient
declined from around 0.6 to 0.54 over the same period.CESifo Forum 1/2011 25
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Brazil’s response to the global financial crisis
The global financial crisis of 2008–09 hit Brazil ini-
tially hard, through a sudden stop of foreign capital
inflows, a significant fall in commodity prices from
their mid-2008 peaks, and a sharp downturn in exter-
nal demand. The ensuing credit crunch and decline in
exports, together with a fall in consumer and business
confidence, were reflected in a cumulative (seasonally
adjusted) decline in GDP of over 6 percent between
the third quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of
2009. The Brazilian authorities’ response was rapid
and multifaceted, including a number of measures to
ease credit conditions; reduce interest rates; support
the exchange rate, partly with a view to moderating
foreign exchange losses for exposed domestic firms;
and provide substantial fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimu-
lus (OECD 2009).
Specifically on the fiscal front, in addition to accom-
modating the cyclical downturn in revenues, the fed-
eral government reduced the rates of selected indirect
taxes (especially on sectors hard hit by the downturn
in demand); increased the threshold and widened the
brackets of the personal income tax; announced a
new subsidized low-income housing program; and
expanded some of the ongoing social assistance pro-
grams. This countercyclical fiscal response contrasted
markedly with previous crisis episodes, when market
pressures, financing constraints and sustainability
concerns had forced pro-cyclical fiscal policies. The
fiscal impulse to demand was reinforced by increases
in current and capital spending already in the
pipeline (in particular, significant adjustments 
in minimum wages and pensions; increases in 
public employment; and additional public investment
under the so-called PAC (Programa de Aceleração do
Crescimento) program.
These measures were reflected in a decline of the cen-
tral government’s primary surplus from the equivalent
of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2008 to 1.3 percent in 2009.
The decline in the primary surplus was moderated by
exceptional revenues, equivalent to an estimated
2 percentage points of GDP.5 The overall deficit
widened to 3.3 percent of GDP, and the net debt of
the central government interrupted the declining
trend of the preceding years, rising by more than
5 percentage points of GDP. In contrast to the feder-
al government, most states and municipalities were
forced by financing constraints to cut back spending
in response to the cyclical decline in own revenues and
in transfers (mainly revenue sharing) from the central
government. As a result, the consolidated primary
surplus of the states declined only slightly in 2009,
and that of the municipalities was virtually
unchanged, compared to 2008 (Ter-Minassian and
Fedelino 2010). 
In addition to budgetary measures, the federal gov-
ernment provided support to demand through some
quasi-fiscal operations (not reflected in the primary
and overall balances and in the net debt6), in particu-
lar subsidized loans to public banks (the National
Development Bank BNDES and the Housing Bank
Caixa Economica Federal) equivalent to about
3.5 percent of GDP in 2009. These operations were
reflected in a larger increase in the gross than in the
net public debt (Figure 2).
Short-term challenges in fiscal macro-management
A pro-cyclical fiscal policy in 2010
The recession was short-lived in Brazil. Reflecting
both favorable external developments (a rapid recov-
ery in key emerging market partners, leading to a
rebound in commodity prices; and a reflow of for-
eign capital, facilitated by the ample liquidity and
low interest rates abroad) and the effects of the
expansionary domestic policies mentioned above,
GDP began to grow again already in the second
quarter of 2009, and accelerated strongly in 2010,
when the growth rate is estimated to have exceeded
7 percent. The recovery was clearly driven by domes-
tic demand (both consumption and investment), as
the growth of imports far outpaced that of exports.
As a result, and despite a significant gain in the
terms of trade, the current account of the balance of
payments deteriorated from the small surplus prior
to crisis to a deficit equivalent to 2.3 percent of GDP
in 2010. At the same time, inflation accelerated
markedly, to an average annualized rate of over
7 percent.7
5 These included: the transfer to the Treasury of deposits held at the
Caixa Economica Federal on account of taxes under judicial dispute;
accelerated collection of tax debts; and a near doubling of dividends
from federal enterprises.
6 The subsidized Treasury loans to public banks are recorded below the
line in the fiscal accounts and do not impact the net debt because they
involve simultaneous increases in the federal government’s assets and
liabilities. However, the substantial difference between the rate paid by
the Treasury on its market borrowing and that received on those loans
is reflected over time in an increase in net interest payments and there-
fore in the overall deficit of the federal government. 
7 The average rate of increase of the main price indices (IPCA, IGP-
DI and IPC-FIPE) in 2010 is estimated by the Central Bank of Brazil
at 0.63 percent per month. The corresponding figure for 2009 was
0.18 percent.Against this background of mounting domestic
demand pressures, fiscal policy remained expansion-
ary in 2010. To be sure, the recorded primary surplus
of the consolidated public sector improved slightly (to
2.8 percent of GDP) and the overall deficit narrowed
correspondingly (Figure 1), but the improvement was
more than accounted for by the proceeds of the sale
of future oil exploration rights to the national oil
company Petrobras (which is not included in the con-
solidated public sector),8 revenues that certainly did
not reduce domestic demand. Federal expenditures
(including the capitalization of Petrobras) rose by
over 22 percent (compared with an estimated growth
of less than 15 percent in nominal GDP) from an
already high level in 2009. While most categories of
expenditures rose significantly in real terms, the
fastest growth was recorded in investment spending
(largely under the expanded PAC-2 program).
Moreover, the federal government continued to sup-
port the expansion of subsidized lending by BNDES
through additional loans equivalent to over 2 percent
of GDP.
Rebalancing the mix of macro-economic policies 
in 2011
Looking ahead, there is growing recognition in Brazil
of the risks (for both inflation and the external
accounts) of a continuation of current macro-eco-
nomic trends. The Central Bank has signaled its
intention to rein back consumer price inflation
towards the official 4.5 percent target, by first arrest-
ing and more recently reversing the decline in its pol-
icy  (SELIC)  interest rate; by increasing reserve
requirements; and by introducing an array of macro-
prudential regulations to moderate credit growth.
However, the tightening of monetary conditions is
likely to stimulate further capital inflows (which so
far do not appear to have responded much to a pro-
gressive tightening of capital controls in recent
months), and to put further upward pressures on the
exchange rate (which is estimated to have appreciated
by nearly 30 percent in real effective terms over the
last 4 years, to a level broadly comparable to that pre-
vailing just before the 1998–99 crisis).
A significant tightening of fiscal policy would help
rebalance the macro-economic policy mix, moderat-
ing the need for monetary restraint and possibly the
pressures on the exchange rate. This is increasingly
being recognized by the fiscal authorities, who are tar-
geting for 2011 a primary surplus target equivalent to
3 percent of GDP. Albeit only marginally higher than
the 2.8 percent of GDP recorded in 2010, the 2011
target would require a significant expenditure con-
tainment effort, since revenues will not benefit this
year from the one-off receipts from the sale of the
future oil rights mentioned above. 
Towards this objective, the authorities have recently
announced a cut of 50 billion real (about 1.2 percent
of GDP) in the federal budget expenditures
approved by the Congress for 2011. While this is an
appropriate signal in the current circumstances, it
appears that, even if implemented in full, these cuts
would still allow an increase in actual spending of
nearly 10 percent (nearly 4 percent in real terms)
from the high level of 2010. Moreover, given the
rigidities in many categories of expenditures (see dis-
cussion below) and the government’s commitment to
safeguard certain types of discretionary spending,
there are concerns that the proposed cuts may not be
realized in full, or may end up being partly reversed
in subsequent years. On a more positive note, the
government has succeeded in moderating substan-
tially the adjustment of the minimum wage for 2011,
which is essential to contain the growth in real terms
of social security benefits.
Main medium-term structural fiscal challenges
Ensuring a sustainable and transparent framework for
fiscal policies
As indicated in the second section above, with the
enactment of its Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) in
2000, Brazil adopted a comprehensive and transpar-
ent framework for fiscal management, appropriately
blending rules and flexibility.9 Although the experi-
ence to date with the implementation of the law has
been in general better than in many other countries,
some important mandates of it (in particular the def-
inition of the ceiling on the federal debt and the cre-
ation of an intergovernmental Fiscal Management
Council) have not been put in practice. Moreover, in
the more recent years the coverage of the target vari-
able (the primary surplus of the consolidated public
sector) has been reduced through the exclusion of
CESifo Forum 1/2011 26
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8 The federal government sold Petrobras the rights to 5 billion bar-
rels from deep-sea (the so-called Pre-sal) fields (not expected to come
into production for several years), and used the proceeds in part to
capitalize the company, to enable it to raise additional funds for its
massive investment programs. The remaining 32 billion Brazilian real
(equivalent to about 0.9 percent of GDP) were used to fund (as rev-
enues above the line) budgetary spending in 2010.
9 See Corbacho and Schwartz (2006), and Ter-Minassian (2010) for
discussions of the Brazilian FRL in an international perspective. CESifo Forum 1/2011 27
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some key public enterprises and of a progressively
expanding set of budgetary investments. Also, the
meaningfulness of the primary balance as an indica-
tor of the fiscal policy stance has been weakened by a
significant use of one-off revenues and quasi-fiscal
operations.
The medium-term sustainability and international
credibility of Brazil’s fiscal policy could be strength-
ened by the following steps:
• announcement by the government of its commit-
ment to declining target paths for both the gross
and the net public debt over the medium term,
and to primary surplus targets consistent ex-ante
with such paths, with a simultaneous commitment
to revisit each year (and adjust as needed) the pri-
mary surplus targets to ensure compliance with
the debt targets. This would represent a strong
signal of commitment to medium-term fiscal sus-
tainability;
• calculation and publication of cyclically adjusted
budget balances as indicators of the fiscal stance,
to guide, along with the sustainability considera-
tions mentioned above, the choice of the primary
balance targets over the cycle. The timely calcula-
tion of a cyclically adjusted balance for 2010
would have helped alert to the pro-cyclical nature
of fiscal policy during that year;
• clarification in the budget document of the nature
and amount of quasi-fiscal operations (such as
funding of financial and non-financial public
enterprises not included in the budget; and private-
public partnerships), with a systematic and trans-
parent analysis of their future costs and risks for
the public finances;
• refraining from (or at a minimum transparently dis-
closing) one-off revenues and/or anticipations of
receipts and delays in expenditures that distort the
assessment of the budget stance; and
• creation of an independent fiscal watchdog
responsible for vetting budgetary projections and
publicly reporting on a timely basis on the consis-
tency of budgetary developments with the fiscal
targets.
Generating adequate public savings to finance needed
investment in infrastructure
Although it is notoriously difficult to reliably calcu-
late infrastructure needs and gaps, there is broad con-
sensus among observers of the Brazilian economy
that, despite the strong increase in the last couple of
years, infrastructure bottlenecks remain substantial
in the country, particularly as concerns roads, rail-
roads, ports and urban sanitation facilities.
Infrastructure investment needs will be compounded
in the next few years by the fact that Brazil will host
major international sporting events (the World Cup
and the Olympic Games). Moreover, the relevant fed-
eral enterprises (Petrobras and Eletrobras) will be
substantially ramping up investments in the energy
sector (in particular oil exploration and electricity
generation). 
How much of the increased investment can be
responsibly financed through debt, as opposed to
higher public savings, depends on a number of con-
siderations, including careful (and duly cautious)
comparisons of the projected streams of costs of the
additional borrowing and of fiscal returns on the
investments; and assessments of conditions in
domestic and external markets. Such considerations
should inform the choice of the target paths of the
public debt and primary balances mentioned above,
as well as the specific choices of investment projects
and their pace of executions, to be reflected in the
next four-year Plan for 2012–15.
The need to increase public savings to fund in part the
higher public investment is reinforced by the consider-
ation that private investment will also need to rise as a
ratio to GDP in the years ahead, to boost the poten-
tial growth rate of the economy and to promote ade-
quate gains in productivity and international compet-
itiveness (which has been significantly eroded by the
appreciation of the exchange rate). The scope to
increase the resort to foreign savings to finance the
increased national investment effort is likely to be lim-
ited, as the current account deficit is already
approaching 3 percent of GDP. Thus, a failure to raise
significantly public savings in the years ahead would
likely put further upward pressure on domestic inter-
est rates, stifling private investment and hindering the
needed recovery of competitiveness. 
Over the longer term, a particular challenge will be
posed by the management of a growing stream of fis-
cal revenues from the exploration of the deep-sea oil
fields. A recently approved law envisages a shift from
the current concession regime to a production-sharing
arrangement (PSA) for the exploration of such fields.
The PSA regime is expected to increase significantly
the federal government’s take of oil revenues. The
resources so obtained will be used to constitute a sav-
ings-type sovereign wealth fund (the Fundo Social).The law mandates that the returns on the investments
of this fund be used for education, health and other
social programs. While the constitution of such a fund
is theoretically sound and in line with international
best practice, significant doubts remain at this point
on how the fund will operate in practice, given the
large degree of discretionality afforded by the law to
the government in its implementation.
Main tax reform needs
At over 35 percent of GDP, the tax burden in Brazil
is already the highest in Latin America, and one of
the highest among emerging market countries.
Therefore, tax reform efforts should focus, rather
than on further increasing the tax ratio, on address-
ing the main distortions and inequities created by the
current tax systems, and on simplifying it, with a
view to reducing compliance costs for taxpayers,
which rank as the highest in the world in a World
Bank index.10 Rapid progress in such reforms would
make an important contribution towards increasing
potential growth and strengthening international
competitiveness.
The area in greatest need of reform is undoubtedly
indirect taxation. In contrast with widespread inter-
national practice, the main form of indirect taxation
in Brazil is state-level VAT (ICMS) levied on intra-
and inter-state sales of goods and selected services, on
a mixed origin and destination basis. It is comple-
mented by a municipal-level tax on other services
(ISS). The federal government also levies selective
excises (IPI), and so-called contributions (PIS and
COFINS)  based on enterprises’ turnover, and ear-
marked for the financing of social security. It has
relied increasingly on these contributions in the last
decade, since their revenue is not shared with the sub-
national governments.
The ICMS (which currently raises the equivalent of
nearly 8 percent of GDP) suffers from a number of
serious shortcomings that include:
• de facto incomplete crediting of exports and capi-
tal goods purchases;
• use of the tax for predatory competition by the
states in attracting investment;
• huge dispersion in rates on intra-state transactions
and in administration procedures, raising sharply
compliance costs, especially for enterprises operat-
ing in multiple states; and
• the fact that it does not cover most services and it
is levied at very high rates on a few services (e.g.
electricity and telecommunications) which repre-
sent key inputs into production processes.
The federal contributions are also quite distortive
because (despite recent reforms) they maintain a sig-
nificant degree of cumulativity which impacts differ-
ently enterprises in the same sector, depending on
their degree of vertical integration.
The need for reform in these areas has long been rec-
ognized by the Brazilian authorities and by economic
opinion-makers, as witnessed by the numerous reform
proposals put forward in recent years. However, past
reform efforts have been stymied by strong opposition
of those states and municipalities most likely to be neg-
atively affected by the proposed changes. The prospects
for reform may be enhanced, over the next year or so,
by the increased urgency of addressing the deteriorat-
ing competitiveness of Brazilian industry, on the one
hand; and by the scope that scheduled reforms of the
intergovernmental transfer system (discussed below)
may create for compensating at least in part sub-
national losses entailed by the tax reform, on the other.
A desirable reform of the indirect tax system would
involve the replacement of the ICMS, ISS, IPI,
COFINS and PIS with a dual (federal and state) VAT,
complemented by federal and state excises, and by a
municipal retail sales tax. The dual VAT should be of
the consumption type (with full credit for both exports
and purchases of capital goods); have a very small
number of rates that could be allowed to vary across
states within a nationwide band;11 and be collected on
an origin basis, to facilitate enforcement, but with the
revenue redistributed on a destination basis through a
clearing house mechanism, to avoid incentives to
predatory tax competition. The introduction of the
dual VAT should be accompanied by steps to harmo-
nize collection and enforcement procedures across the
national territory. This would contribute to both mak-
ing the administration of the tax more effective, and
reducing compliance costs.
Another area of the tax system in need of reform is
labor taxation. According to OECD (2009) calcula-
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10 A compact and up-to-date overview of the Brazilian tax system
can be found in Afonso and Barroso (2008). See also OECD (2009)
and Rezende (2010) for more comprehensive discussions of tax
reform needs. 
11 There is broad consensus in the literature that redistributive objec-
tives should be pursued through expenditure policies, rather than
through a proliferation of VAT rates. A degree of differentiation
among states may be necessary to allow adequate play to the histor-
ically well entrenched autonomy of the states in this area.CESifo Forum 1/2011 29
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tions, the combined burden of employer and employ-
ee contributions to the social security system (pen-
sions and unemployment insurance) and assorted
other levies on payroll can exceed 50 percent, damp-
ening demand especially for low-skilled labor and cre-
ating a significant incentive to informality. Given
however the precarious current state of the social
security finances, the scope for a significant reduction
of this burden hinges largely on simultaneous reforms
of social security benefits (see also discussion below).
In the short term, reform efforts could focus on a
rationalization of the payroll levies to finance training
and other labor services (the so-called S system).
Finally, reforms in both taxation areas should be
accompanied by a review and narrowing of the scope
of the simplified system for taxation of small and
medium enterprises (the so-called SIMPLES), which,
by providing a substantial tax preference to enterpris-
es with turnover below a (too high) ceiling, signifi-
cantly erodes the tax base and constitutes a disincen-
tive to enterprise growth beyond that ceiling.
Reforming intergovernmental transfers
A further priority area for reform (and one that is
closely linked with tax reform) is the system of inter-
governmental transfers (including revenue-sharing).
The current system is characterized by:
• low discretionality of the transfers (most of which
are mandated, and defined in considerable detail,
by laws, or even by the Constitution). This imparts
to the system relatively high degrees of transparen-
cy, predictability, and immunity from continuous
political bargaining, but also of cyclical volatility
and inflexibility in the face of changing economic,
social and demographic trends;
• the fact that a significant portion of the revenue
sharing arrangements is based on derivation (geo-
graphic origin of the revenue) criteria, thus com-
pounding the already substantial differences in rev-
enue capacities that characterize sub-national own
taxes. The (also derivation-based) sharing of nat-
ural resource rents further aggravates these differ-
ences, as such resources are concentrated in rela-
tively few states and municipalities;
• a relatively high degree of fragmentation of the
sharing arrangements, as regards the purpose of
the different regimes, the definition of their bases
(with resulting distortive incentives for upper
level governments to exploit non-shared taxes),
and their distribution formulas. This complicates
the assessment of the allocative and distribution-
al effects of the overall revenue sharing system;
and finally
• lack of a comprehensive and well-designed equa-
lization transfer system. While existing studies
suggest that some of the existing transfers have a
(more or less significant) progressive redistribu-
tive impact, they fall well short of an equaliza-
tion system.
A reform of the main revenue-sharing mechanisms
(the Fundo de Participação dos Estados (FPE) and the
Fundo de Participação dos Municípios (FPM)) has
been mandated in 2010 by the Constitutional Court,
which found the current criteria for horizontal distri-
bution of the transfers unconstitutional.
The reform of the system should be guided by the
objectives of simplifying it, making its effects more
transparent, reducing its sensitivity to the cycle, and
especially making it more equitable. As the interna-
tional experience shows, however, there are likely to be
trade-offs between some of these objectives, and care-
ful choices would need to be made in the design of a
reformed system. To maximize the chances of politi-
cal acceptability of proposed reforms, a further objec-
tive should be the broad maintenance of the vertical
distribution of the total transfers among the three lev-
els of government.
As regards the more complex issue of the horizontal
distribution of the transfers, a theoretical first best
would be the implementation of a full-fledged equal-
ization system combining both revenue capacities and
spending needs equalization criteria. As the experi-
ence of Australia shows, however, such a system
would be so demanding in terms of data requirements
and resources for its effective implementation that it
does not appear to be a practical option for the fore-
seeable future in Brazil. A more manageable alterna-
tive would appear to be the implementation of a sys-
tem to equalize revenue capacities (such as e.g. the
Canadian one), which could be developed initially
only for the state level, given the more limited number
of entities involved. 
Expenditure reform needs
The need to maintain, for macro-economic stability
and longer-term fiscal sustainability reasons, signifi-
cant (2–3 percent of GDP on average over the cycle)
primary surpluses, and the already high level of the
tax burden highlight the need to arrest the relentlessincrease in the size of the public sector over the last
decade. Indeed, Brazil could benefit from adopting at
all levels of government expenditure rules consistent
with this aim. Moreover, as indicated above, there is a
clear need to reduce current spending as a ratio to
GDP, to create fiscal space for the needed increase in
public investment.
Unfortunately, these are likely to prove difficult tasks,
requiring fundamental changes in the legal (in some
cases constitutional) frameworks for major spending
categories, and therefore a strong government com-
mitment to building the necessary broad base of polit-
ical and social support for such changes. The difficul-
ty reflects a number of factors, in particular:
• pervasive rigidities in the main public expenditure
programs, ranging from extensive earmarking
provisions,12 to selective indexation require-
ments,13 and to strict tenure provisions for civil
servants; and
• mounting pressures on spending on pensions and
health, due to ongoing demographic changes that
are leading to population aging at a faster pace
than in most advanced and emerging market
countries. 
Space limitations prevent a comprehensive analysis in
this paper14 of needed expenditure reforms in the
health, education, public administration and social
security systems, as well as of ongoing and further
desirable reform efforts in public expenditure manage-
ment systems, aimed at improving the cost-effective-
ness of existing spending programs. Because of their
importance, however, reform needs in the pension sys-
tem are briefly discussed in what follows.
The public component of the pension system in
Brazil includes separate regimes for private and
public employees. Expenditures of the former
(Regime Geral da Previdência Social, RGPS) (with
over 23 million beneficiaries) amount to over 7 per-
cent of GDP; those of the latter (Regime da
Previdência dos Servidores Públicos, RPPS) (with
about 3 million beneficiaries) to around 2 percent of
GDP. Both are defined-benefit, pay-as-you-go sys-
tems, currently running primary deficits in excess of
1 percent of GDP each, despite the above-men-
tioned relatively high levels of social security contri-
butions. There is also a growing network of private
(open or closed) pension funds, operating mostly on
a defined contribution basis, and participation in
which is voluntary.
The RGPS suffers from a number of significant weak-
nesses that are largely responsible for the relatively
high (in an international perspective) level of its
expenditure:
• indexation of its minimum benefits (about 40 per-
cent of total benefits) to the minimum wage (which
rose by over 120 percent in real terms over the last
15 years);
• absence of a minimum retirement age requirement
after 35 years of contributory service;
• a relatively low minimum retirement age for women
(60 years, or less after 30 years of service); and
• excessively generous survivor benefits.
The RPPS is widely recognized to suffer from exces-
sive generosity in both the retirement age and deter-
mination of benefits provision.
Previous reform efforts (in 1998 and 2003) included
the introduction of a formula (fator previdenciário) to
link the level of benefits under the RGPS to recipi-
ents’life expectancy, and to modify the RPPS for new
public employees.15 These reforms moderated signifi-
cantly the growth of the RPPS benefits, but had a
limited impact on the expenditures of the RGPS, that
have been boosted strongly by the above-mentioned
growth of the minimum wage.
Looking forward, a comprehensive reform of the pen-
sion system, aimed at ensuring its longer term finan-
cial viability during the coming demographic changes,
would need to include: 
• indexing benefits to prices, rather than the mini-
mum wage;
• introducing a unified minimum retirement age
requirement for all pensioners, linked to the rising
average life expectancy;
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12 These provisions include the earmarking of federal contribu-
tions on payroll, turnover, and company profits to fund social
security expenditures; a constitutional requirement to devote
25 percent of total primary spending to education; and an (also
constitutional) mandate to increase health spending at least in
line with nominal GDP.
13 For example, the minimum pension and social assistance benefits
are indexed to the minimum wage, which is in turn indexed to price
(with a one-year lag) and real GDP growth (with a two-year lag). 
14 Selective references to detailed studies of needed expenditure
reforms (in particular in the social security, health, and civil service
systems; and in expenditure management systems) are provided in
the bibliography attached.
15 The 2003 reform envisaged the introduction of a ceiling (the same
as under the RGPS) for the pension benefits under the RPPS. This
was to occur simultaneously with the creation of a complementary
mandatory defined-contribution regime for new public employees.
Both reforms have not been implemented to date.CESifo Forum 1/2011 31
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• implementing the ceiling on pension benefits and
introducing a complementary mandatory defined-
contribution regime for public employees, as envis-
aged by the 2003 reform; and 
• tightening eligibility requirements for survivors’
pensions.
To facilitate their social acceptance, most of these
reforms should be adequately phased-in, and existing
pensioners should be grandfathered.
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